An Essay Concerning Some Problems with the Constitutional-Doubt Canon by Flowers, Benjamin M.
Washington and Lee Law Review Online 
Volume 74 Issue 2 Article 2 
2-21-2018 
An Essay Concerning Some Problems with the Constitutional-
Doubt Canon 
Benjamin M. Flowers 
Jones Day 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin M. Flowers, An Essay Concerning Some Problems with the Constitutional-Doubt Canon, 74 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 248 (2018), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol74/iss2/2 
This Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review Online by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 




An Essay Concerning Some Problems 
with the Constitutional-Doubt Canon 
Benjamin M. Flowers* 
Abstract 
 
The constitutional-doubt canon instructs that statutes should 
be interpreted in a way that avoids placing their constitutionality 
in doubt. This canon is often said to rest on the presumption that 
Congress does not intend to exceed its constitutional 
authority. That presumption, however, is inconsistent with the 
notion that government actors tend to exceed their lawful 
authority—a notion that motivates our constitutional structure, 
and in particular the series of checks and balances that the 
Constitution creates. This tension between the constitutional-
doubt canon and the Constitution’s structure would be acceptable 
if the canon accurately reflected the manner in which the public 
understands legislative enactments. But it doesn’t. Thus, the only 
possible justification for the constitutional-doubt canon is stare 
decisis. 
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I. Introduction 
Our Constitution is built on a profound distrust of 
government. Members of the founding generation understood 
that government officials are mortals, not angels.
1
 And they 
understood that all mortals, even well-meaning ones, will tend to 
aggrandize their power, exercising authority they do not have. So 
the founding generation wrote and ratified a constitution that 
harnessed that temptation: It established three co-equal 
branches, divided sovereignty between the state and federal 
governments, and empowered each to check overreach by the 
others.
2
 Thus, the natural tendency of government officials to 
vigorously enforce and protect their own authority would cause 
them to resist encroachment (that is, overreach) by those in other 
branches and levels of government.
3
 
The constitutional-doubt canon is in tension with this design. 
That interpretive rule instructs that “[a] statute should be 
interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in 
doubt.”4 In other words, the canon presumes that Congress did 
not exceed its constitutional authority. This presumption 
contradicts the skepticism toward government actors that our 
                                                                                                     
 1. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 349 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary 
to controul the abuses of government . . . . If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary.”).  
 2. See id. (“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the 
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who 
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal 
motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”); id. (describing the “constant 
aim” of our constitution “to divide and arrange the several offices in such a 
manner as that each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of 
every individual, may be a centinel over the public rights”); see also U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that 
our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each 
protected from incursion by the other.”). 
 3. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–99 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that “the parchment delineation of the boundaries” 
between the branches of government would be ineffective without our system of 
checks and balances) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 at 494 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
 4. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW § 38, at 247 (2012). 
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Constitution embodies. That would be tolerable if the canon 
reflected the way that statutes were naturally understood. But it 
does not, and so the only justification for the canon’s existence is 
stare decisis. Or so I will argue. 
II. The Constitutional-Doubt Canon and Expected Meaning 
The constitutional-doubt canon is sometimes described as 
resting on the “presumption that Congress did not intend” to 
enact a statute that “raises serious constitutional doubts.”
5
 Thus, 
the thinking goes, when a statute is susceptible of multiple 
interpretations, courts ought to choose the constitutionally 
permissible one. 
The justification fails at the outset, because it is based on the 
false notion that courts ought to give statutes the meaning that 
Congress intended rather than the one it enacted. This notion is 
false because we are governed by the laws that Congress passes, 
not the ones it wanted to pass.
6
 And even if Congressional intent 




Properly interpreting a statute means giving the statute 
whatever meaning it had at the time of its enactment.
8
 Canons of 
interpretation, to the extent they are valid, assist this task; they 
provide heuristics that judges can use for determining the 
manner in which the public would have understood the 
legislation at the time of its enactment. An interpretive cannon’s 
validity thus turns on how reliably it points courts to the original 
public meanings of the statutes they interpret. And on that score, 
                                                                                                     
 5. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).  
 6. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 523 (2012) (finding that 
statute meant what it said, notwithstanding evidence that the chief legislative 
sponsor intended to enact the opposite of what the plain meaning required). 
 7. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: 
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
 8. See Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785, 788 (2015) (recognizing 
that statutes retain the meaning they had at the time of their enactment); 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, § 7, at 78–92 (explaining the “fixed-meaning 
canon,” according to which statutes “must be given the meaning they had when” 
they were “adopted”). 
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the constitutional-doubt canon fails miserably. I am aware of no 
evidence that presumptions regarding constitutionality are 
somehow baked into public perceptions regarding statutory 
meaning. Again, the founding generation recognized that 
legislatures (indeed, all governments and government actors) 
would tend to exceed their authority. Nothing in the time since 
has happened to prove them wrong. The suggestion that the 
constitutional-doubt canon reflects public understanding is 
therefore difficult to take seriously—which is perhaps why, so far 
as I can tell, no one has ever tried to mount this defense. 
One might object that canons of interpretation do more than 
function “as empirical heuristics for interpreting new texts.”
9
 At 
least some substantive canons are “distinct rules of unwritten 
law, which act of their own force in future cases unless abrogated 
or impliedly repealed.”
10
 So it is with the constitutional-doubt 
canon, the argument goes.  
This is surely an accurate description of the way in which 
substantive canons work in practice. But it seems to me there are 
only two justifications for such rules. First, the substantive 
background rules may be so well established that they accurately 
reflect the manner in which the public understands statutory 
text. That justification cannot work here, since there is no basis 
for inferring that the constitutional-doubt canon accurately 
captures public understanding. And at the time of the 
Constitution’s ratification, the constitutional-doubt canon could 
not possibly have been so well-established a rule, since Anglo-
American jurisprudence had not previously required assessing 
the constitutionality of statutes against a written constitution. 
The second justification is stare decisis. That justification is quite 
powerful, as I’ll discuss later, but its force has nothing to do with 
the canon’s interpretive accuracy.  
The foregoing assumes that legislative intent is irrelevant to 
the interpretive task. But even if we assume that intent does 
matter, does the canon fare any better? That is, is there any 
                                                                                                     
 9. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1105 (2017). 
 10. Id. at 1106. 
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reason to suppose that Congress does generally intend not to pass 
unconstitutional laws?  
No. The framers rightly realized that government actors will 
tend to exceed their lawful authority, not hew to it. Two-hundred-
plus years of experience with state and federal legislatures 









) confirms the founding generation’s wisdom. This is no 
slight to legislators, the vast majority of whom are no doubt 
motivated by a good-faith belief that the legislation they propose 
will improve public welfare. But that is precisely the problem: 
Legislators—indeed, all elected officials—obtain and keep their 
jobs by promising to deliver results for their constituents. If the 
Constitution stands in the way of delivering those results, one 
would expect them to violate the Constitution. Moreover, as 
discussed below, the form of judicial restraint on which the canon 
arguably rests may have the effect of exacerbating this tendency 
in legislators and executive officers. 
The upshot of this is that this canon cannot be justified by 
Congressional intent: Assuming there is any such thing, it is 
doubtful that legislators can fairly be presumed to intend to act 
constitutionally.   
III. The Constitutional-Doubt Canon and Constitutional Structure 
The more plausible justifications for the constitutional-doubt 
canon are not interpretive justifications at all. Rather, most who 
are candid will admit that it “represents judicial policy—a 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (holding section 13 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional). 
 12. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 432 (1870) (holding that a 
Maryland law, which “impose[d] a discriminating tax upon all persons trading 
in” a particular manner “who are not permanent residents in the State,” 
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
 13. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954) (holding that state 
laws segregating students on the basis of race violate the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 14. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 504 (2010) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority when it imposed 
“dual for-cause limitations” on the President’s removal power). 
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judgment that statutes ought not to tread on questionable 
constitutional grounds unless they do so clearly.”
15
 Let’s suppose 
that “judicial policy” has any place in statutory interpretation. 
Does judicial policy support the canon? 
Still no. Start with the notion that “statutes ought not to 
tread on questionable constitutional grounds unless they do so 
clearly.”
16
 Why would that be? Our Constitution gives to each 
branch a set of limited powers. But each branch is free to exercise 
those powers to their limits. To use a driving analogy, 
government actors receive either a green light or a red light; 
there is no yellow light that requires them to use caution as they 
approach the limits of their powers. And to pretend there is to 
permit the judiciary to overstep its powers in the guise of judicial 
restraint; to limit the authority of the other branches (and the 




Some have also suggested that the canon is justified by a 
different policy: “courts should minimize the occasions on which 
they confront and perhaps contradict the legislative branch.”
18
 
This rationale cannot be reconciled with our constitutional 
structure. Once again, our Constitution is designed to pit the 
branches against one another. They are supposed to forthrightly 
confront and contradict one another. (Again, the constitutional-
doubt canon sometimes causes courts to contradict Congress by 
                                                                                                     
 15. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, § 38, at 249. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and 
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983)  
The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising 
constitutional questions is therefore to enlarge the already vast reach 
of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant 
modern interpretation of the Constitution—to create a judge-made 
constitutional “penumbra” that has much the same prohibitory effect 
as the judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself. 
See also United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir. 1990) (en 
banc) (“The canon about avoiding constitutional decisions, in particular, must be 
used with care, for it is a closer cousin to invalidation than to interpretation. It 
is a way to enforce the constitutional penumbra, and therefore an aspect of 
constitutional law proper.”). 
 18. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at 249. 
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giving its statutes an unfair reading.
19
 But thwarting other 
branches in the legitimate exercise of their authority, and doing 
so while pretending to exercise restraint, is neither forthright nor 
a permissible exercise of the constitutional check.) When their 
willingness to do so wanes, the likelihood that constitutional 
actors will exceed their constitutional authority waxes. So, 
perhaps it is no surprise that, in the decades after the 
constitutional-doubt canon received its most famous 
endorsement,
20
 the Court repeatedly deferred to Congress’s 
exercise of legislative authority; thus permitting the exercise of 
legislative power unimaginable for the first hundred and fifty 
years of American history. This is not to say that the 
constitutional-doubt canon necessarily (or even usually) means 
deferring to Congress; once again, it often means unlawfully 
trimming Congress’s work. What I mean to say is that the 
constitutional-doubt canon, insofar as it springs from the notion 
that the branches ought to avoid conflict, springs from the same 
misguided concept of “judicial restraint” that resulted in a vast 
expansion of federal authority. 
Judges should not needlessly seek out conflict. Judicial 
usurpation is no better than judicial abnegation. My point is 
simply that courts ought not actively avoid confrontation: 
Legislation should be given a fair reading, and should be held 
unconstitutional when (and only when) it is.  
IV. The Constitutional-Doubt Canon and Stare Decisis 
                                                                                                     
 19. See supra note 17; Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active 
Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
2109, 2112 (2015) (criticizing the canon on the ground that it “leads to tortured 
constructions of statutes that bear little resemblance to laws actually passed by 
the elected branches”). 
 20. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn 
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a 
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of 
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” (quoting 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932))). 
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The foregoing establishes, at most, that the 
constitutional-doubt canon should never have been adopted. But 
it does not follow that courts ought to abandon it now. The reason 
is stare decisis. Courts began using the constitutional-doubt 
canon no later than the 1800s.
21
 Since the 1940s, at least, it has 
been a staple of judicial opinions. Congress and state legislatures 
have thus legislated in the shadow of this canon. As a result, it is 
quite likely that at least some laws have been passed in reliance 
on the canon’s existence. That is, legislatures may have passed 
constitutionally dubious laws because their members knew or 
believed that the courts would bail them out if push came to 
shove. 
What to do about this? That goes far beyond the scope of this 
paper. Whether and when to defer to precedent has left people 
much smarter than I am with little to offer.
22
 For my purposes, it 
suffices to say that stare decisis is an important consideration—
one that even originalists ought to take seriously
23
—and that it 
may well end up requiring courts to go on applying the 
constitutional-doubt canon. But if stare decisis is not a good 
defense, then the canon is indefensible. 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 
73 n.9 (1995) (tracing the canon’s history). 
 22. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial 
Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 433 (1988)  
I have brought you a few contentions: that the role of precedent 
should be similar for all decisions interpreting texts, with any 
difference in the direction of making it harder to revise constitutional 
interpretation, and that precedent can be a destabilizing as well as a 
stabilizing influence. Beyond those affronts to accepted wisdom I 
have little to say. I began without a theory of stare decisis and end 
that way. 
 23. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling 
Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009). 
